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Schill and Wachter's The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America' is a rich and stimulat-
ing article on a vitally important topic: the role of federal housing
law and policy in creating the concentrations of poverty that
devastate our society. The authors of this article and the organizers
of this Symposium deserve great credit for addressing one of the
most serious problems in United States society today: the extreme
residential separation imposed on blacks and the concentrated
poverty that results.
I have two general criticisms of the article. My first, and
principal, criticism is that Schill and Wachter pay too little attention
to the racial discrimination and segregation that pervade the federal
housing programs. They begin by identifying several causes of
concentrated poverty, including racial discrimination and federal
housing policies, but do not discuss the conjunction of these two
causes. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have shown that a
fundamental way in which federal housing policies have concentrat-
ed poverty has been through racial discrimination and segregation
in the administration of those programs. 2  The Civil Rights
Commission has reported that of all the sources of residential
segregation, "[t]he Federal Government ... has ... been most
influential in creating and maintaining urban residential segrega-
tion."3 If we agree that residential segregation concentrates black
poverty, then federal housing policy stands indicted as a principal
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' Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law
and Policy: The Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285 (1995).
2
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
3 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 114 (1977).
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cause of concentrating poverty.4 The bulk of my response address-
es the issue of racial segregation in the federal housing programs.
My second criticism is that the language of Schill and
Wachter's article creates confusion by often treating as synonyms
the terms "black," "poverty," and "problem household" and the
terms "low-income," "poor," and "welfare recipient." The non-
equivalence of the first three terms should be obvious. The non-
equivalence of the second three terms is a matter of statutory and
administrative definition. Using national average figures, "low-
income," for most federal housing programs, means an income of
no more than $28,000 per year for a family of four;5 "poor" means
an income approximately half of that, or $14,335 per year;6 and
recipients of "welfare" or, as I prefer, public assistance, receive cash
benefits of no more than approximately $5200 per year, less than
half the poverty-level income.7 Analysis of the issues is obscured
when these concepts are not distinguished from one another.
In this response, I comment on four aspects of Schill and
Wachter's article: (1) causes of concentrated poverty in the public
housing program; (2) the relationship of large public housing
developments to neighborhood poverty; (3) current policies that
concentrate poverty in public housing; and (4) possible solutions to
the concentration of poverty. Public housing must be considered
in the context of the full array of federal housing laws and policies,
including the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC),8 the home
' See David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of
Residential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
407, 409 (1994) (book review).
5 See Kathryn P. Nelson, Whose Shortage of Affordable Housing?, 5 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 401, 406-08 (1994). For many housing programs, "low income" in the
context of low-income families is defined as "incomes [that] do not exceed 80 per
centum of the median income for the area," 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1988); the
national average area median income was $34,800 in 1989. See Nelson, supra, at 407.
6 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 1155 (Comm. Print 1994); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
WEIGHTED AVERAGE POVERTY THRESHOLDS IN 1993 (1994) (stating the 1993 weighted
poverty threshold as $14,763 for a family of four); U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Preliminary Estimate of Poverty Thresholds in 1994 (1995) (unpublished statistics, on
file with author) (stating the estimated 1994 weighted poverty threshold as $15,141
for a family of four).
7 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 6, at 369 (reporting the
median state AFDC maximum benefit for a four-person family as $435 per month).
Under current law, families receiving AFDC assistance are eligible for Medicaid
coverage, and most are eligible for food stamp benefits as well. See id. at 333-34.
' For a discussion of the segregatory impact of the HOLC, see KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 195-
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mortgage loan insurance and guarantee programs of the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA), and the Department of Agriculture;9 urban renewal and
community development programs;10 tax programs, including the
home mortgage interest deduction and the low-income housing tax
credit; and the many demand- and supply-side subsidies of the
public and assisted housing programs administered by HUD and the
Department of Agriculture. In addition, it is important to take into
203 (1985).
' For the segregatory effect of the FHA and VA programs, see id. at 203-18;
Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American
Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw.
U. L. REV. 491, 590-95 (1979) (discussing studies concluding that FHA-assisted
housing programs tend to maintain, if not exacerbate, existing segregative housing
patterns).
The Department of Agriculture (DOA) has provided only partial and unsatis-
factory information about the civil rights aspects of its housing programs. The 1987
Housing and Community Development Act requires HUD and DOA to file annual
civil rights reports. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-242, § 562, 101 Stat. 1815, 1944 (1988). The DOA has filed only one, for
fiscal year 1991. Although the DOA acknowledged that the report had "shortcom-
ings" and promised improvements, no other report has been filed. FARMERS HOME
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE BENEFICIARIES OF USDA HOUSING
PROGRAMS IN RURAL AMERICA 1 (1992) (fiscal year 1991 annual report to Congress).
1o See CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME: A REPORT ON
THE CONTINUING FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EQUAL
HOUSING OPPORTUNITY 13 (1983) [hereinafter A DECENT HOME] ("[Urban renewal]
programs operated to push displaced minorities into overcrowded substandard,
segregated neighborhoods, often creating more slums and blights."); see also Pleune
v. Pierce, 765 F. Supp. 43,47 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that agency failure to consider
the effect of a mixed-use development project on the racial composition of
surrounding low- and moderate-income neighborhoods violated Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968); NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361,370 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding
that agency failure to require effective fair housing enforcement in its administration
of the Urban Development Action Grants and Community Development Block Grants
to Boston violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968); Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 27 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (holding HUD and the City of
Hamtramck liable under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for approving an
urban renewal project that did not include plans to provide new low-income housing
developments for black residents displaced by the project's renovations); CAROLYN
ADAMS ET AL., PHILADELPHIA: NEIGHBORHOODS, DIVISION, AND CONFLICT IN A
POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY 106-10 (1991) (explaining how federal and state urban renewal
plans failed to spur development in Philadelphia's inner-city low-income neighbor-
hoods); MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER 7-8, 64-65,217 (1964) (showing
the disparate racial impact of a federal urban renewal program); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH,
MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 273-
75 (1983) (summarizing the role of Chicago's redevelopment program in displacing
and segregating blacks); Marc A. Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in
URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY 68-72 (Pierre Clavel et al.
eds., 1980).
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account other federal policies that have a substantial role in
concentrating poverty" and the shared responsibility of state and
local government agencies for racial discrimination and concentrat-
ed poverty.1
2
" Federal and local highway and mass transit policies have had a substantial
impact on housing segregation and concentrations of poverty. See Yale Rabin, Federal
Urban Transportation Policy and the Highway Planning Process in Metropolitan Areas, 451
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 21, 21 (1980) (noting "the isolation of central
city transit-dependent minorities from suburban employment" as an adverse impact
of highways). The federal interstate highway program alone displaced tens of
thousands of minority, mostly black, people and destroyed neighborhoods, some of
which were integrated. Mass transit policies also have perpetuated residential
segregation patterns. SeeJACKSON, supra note 8, at 168-71 (discussing transportation
and federal policies with regard to mass transit); Raymond A. Mohl, Race and Space
in the Modern City: Interstate-95 and the Black Community in Miami, in URBAN POLICY
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 100 (Arnold R. Hirsch & Raymond A. Mohl eds.,
1993). David James identifies another federal program whose powerful, although
perhaps unintended, consequence was segregatory: "The implementation of the New
Deal farm programs and succeeding farm policies that drastically reduced the acres
devoted to cotton and tobacco in the South is the best example of a policy with
unintended ghetto-building consequences." James, supra note 4, at 409 n.7.
1" School policies, for example, have been a powerful cause of housing segrega-
tion, which in turn concentrates poverty. Segregation in public education creates
segregated housing because only in desegregated school systems will whites remain
in or move to neighborhoods of significant minority population. See Gary Orfield,
Ghettoization and Its Alternatives, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 161, 192 (Paul E.
Peterson ed., 1985) [hereinafter Orfield, Ghettoization] ("[T]here is considerable
evidence that metropolitan school desegregation plans produce more integrated
residential areas over time .... since there is no fear of ghettoization of the local
schools and no incentive to move to a whiter school elsewhere."); Gary Orfield,
Housing as a Justification for Resegregating Schools: Consequences of Changing
Judicial Interpretations 46-80 (April 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also JULIET SALTMAN, A FRAGILE MOVEMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION 396 (1990) ("Unless racial balance is empirically
present in a neighborhood's public schools, a majority of whites with children will not
perceive that neighborhood as a desirable one and will not move into it.").
Other local decisions that cause segregation include the exercise of development
controls, the provision of municipal facilities and services, and similar activities
funded under the Community Development Block Grant program. See Yale Rabin,
The Roots of Segregation in the Eighties: The Role of Local Government Actions, in DIVIDED
NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 208, 212-24 (Gary
A. Tobin ed., 1987) (discussing specific local government policies that have had a
segregative effect); see also THOMAS L. PHILPOTr, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO:
IMMIGRANTS, BLACKS, AND REFORMERS IN CHICAGO, 1880-1930, at 304 (1991) ("Public
officials.., did their best to locate and administer clinics and dispensaries, parks and
playgrounds, swimming pools and beaches, libraries, schools, and other facilities in
a way that would hold the mingling of blacks and whites to a minimum.").
INTENTIONAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
I. THE CAUSES OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY
IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
Schill and Wachter assert that the federal housing program that
"has generated the most intense pattern of concentrated poverty"
is the public housing program.1 3 This is true only in the narrow
sense that public housing serves the largest number of poor people.
More poor people live in public housing than in housing associated
with any other government program because poor people generally
are excluded from the other housing programs. Much to the credit
of the public housing program, it has been open and hospitable to
very poor people when every other government housing program
has excluded or severely limited their participation. 4
To some extent, very poor people are excluded from other
programs because the programs provide only a shallow subsidy, so
that very poor people would have to pay extremely high percentages
of their incomes for rent. (This is true, for example, of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit program and interest-credit programs
such as sections 221(d)(3) 15 and 236.16) Some very poor people
still would choose to live in those shallow-subsidy developments,
preferring to pay high percentages of their income rather than live
in terrible housing; others have Section 8 certificates or vouchers
and would choose to use them in those shallow-subsidy develop-
ments. Many of these very poor families, however, are excluded
from these developments by a series of devices: minimum income
requirements, refusal to accept Section 8 certificate or voucher
holders, 7 refusal to accept public assistance recipients, or outright
15 Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1291.
14 See SandraJ. Newman & Ann B. Schnare, Last in Line: Housing Assistance for
Households with Children, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 417, 434 (1993). Newman and
Schnare conclude:
The most striking finding of this research is that the system of housing
assistance channels different types of households with children into different
housing programs. Households with the highest incomes, lowest welfare
dependency rates, highest educational achievement, fewest children, and
smallest concentration of female heads are most likely to end up in privately
owned assisted stock. Households applying for assistance directly to PHAs
are likewise sorted into groups, and the most disadvantaged end up in
public housing.
Id.
15 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1988).
16 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1988).
'v In general, discrimination on the basis of income source is not prohibited.
There are two federal exceptions. First, landlords who already rent to Section 8
tenants are prohibited from discriminating against other Section 8 applicants. See 42
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racial, ethnic or other illegal discrimination. Even more telling,
there are other federal housing programs that offer deep subsidies
and that are, in theory, as available to very poor people as public
housing. The Section 8 program, for example, has essentially the
same income eligibility and preference requirements as does public
housing, but the incomes of Section 8 residents are higher than the
incomes of public housing residents."8 This is because very poor
people often are excluded from Section 8. Similarly, the Section
202 program for the elderly and handicapped is deeply subsidized
and can serve very poor people, but the income levels in Section
202 housing are above the levels in public housing.' 9 We need to
ask not what it is about public housing that makes it open to very
poor people, but what it is about the other federal housing
programs that keeps very poor people out of them.
A. Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Public
and Other Housing Programs as a Cause
of Concentrated Poverty
The first and most important point to make is that public
housing and the other federal housing programs have been used to
create and maintain racial discrimination and rigid segregation
which, as Massey and Denton show, concentrates poverty.
U.S.C. § 1437f(t) (1988). Second, Low Income Housing Tax Credit sponsors are
prohibited from discriminating against Section 8 certificate holders under I.R.C.
§ 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) (Supp. V 1993). Even in the fewjurisdictions in which it is illegal to
discriminate on the basis of source of income, such discrimination is common. See,
e.g., SHAUN DONOVAN, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, MOVING TO THE
SUBURBS: SECTION 8 MOBILITY AND PORTABILITY IN HARTFORD 33 (Working Paper
W94-3, 1994) (discussing Section 8 discrimination in Hartford, Connecticut). On
occasion, such discrimination has been invalidated as a pretext for discrimination on
the basis of race or gender. See HUD v. Ross, No. HUDALJ 01-92-0466-8, Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending (P-H) 25,075 (HUD Office of Admin. Law Judges July 7, 1994).
IS Public housing and Section 8 applicants may not have incomes above 80% of
the median income in the geographic area, and most may not have incomes above
50% of the median. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(b)(2), 1437(n) (Supp. V 1993); C.F.R.
§§ 913.103-913.105 (1991). In 1989, median household income for public housing
tenants was $6571; for certificate/voucher holders it was $7060; and for private,
project-based subsidized tenants it was $8074. See CONNIE H. CASEY, U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS
IN 1989, at 10 (1992). Newman and Schnare report a similar disparity: average
household income for public housing tenants is $9142; for certificate and voucher
holders, $9609. See Newman & Schnare, supra note 14, at 422. Furthermore,
"observed income patterns may also reflect an ongoing tendency to channel the upper
end of the eligible population into privately owned assisted stock." Id. at 424.
'9 See CASEY, supra note 18, at 2, 10.
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The federal government intentionally established the public
housing program on a dejure racially segregated basis.2 Schill and
Wachter note that the federal public housing program gave
considerable authority over siting decisions to local communities,
enabling some to exclude public housing altogether and allowing
others to confine public housing to high-density developments on
small sites.2 1 The historical and legal literature establishes that the
single most powerful explanation for this exclusion and confine-
ment of family public housing has been hostility to people of color,
particularly blacks; 22 and the historical and legal literature also
21 See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding HUD
liable for intentional racial segregation in Chicago's public housing); Young v. Pierce,
628 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-51 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (describing HUD's involvement in the
creation and perpetuation of segregated public housing in east Texas and nationally);
A DECENT HOME, supra note 10, at 6 ("Only one program, public housing, explicitly
recognized a right of participation by minorities and then only on a segregated
basis."); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF
FRUSTRATION 123-24 (1968) (commenting on the open, explicit nature of public
housing race discrimination and segregation); ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE
POOR: THE CASE FOR HEROISM 11-15 (1978) (describing the federal role in
segregating public housing); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETFO 157-77 (1948)
(explaining early administrative policies that promoted racial segregation). Indeed,
when Congress was considering the legislation that became the 1949 HousingAct, an
amendment to desegregate the public housing program was defeated by the liberals,
such as Senator Paul Douglas, on the ground that they thought the program could
not survive were it not segregated. See NATHANIEL S. KEITH, POLITICS AND THE
HOUSING CRISIS SINCE 1930, at 93 (1973) (explaining that "they had the difficult
choice of voting for nondiscrimination and assuring defeat of the legislation, or
voting against desegregation and saving the bill"). A timely illustration of intentional
segregation is provided in a suit recently filed in Baltimore, Maryland, challenging the
intentional and continued segregation in the public housing program there. A
federal report on McCulloh Homes, the "colored housing project," recites that
adjacent projects were planned to "offer a splendid barrier against the encroachment
of colored" people into a "good white residential neighborhood." See Class Action
Complaint at 17, Thompson v. HUD (D. Md. filed Jan. 31, 1995) (No. MJG 95-309).
2 The U.S. Housing Act restricted the placement of public housing to communi-
ties that would enter into "cooperation agreements" with local public housing
authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e)(2) (1988). The "cooperation agreement"
requirement has been a principal tool of white communities that wish to exclude
public housing. See POLIKOFF, supra note 20, at 12 ("By simply refusing to make [a
cooperation agreement], local officials could veto a proposed project .... [and] had
the power to decide whether public housing was to be built at all in their communi-
ties .... ."). See generally Richard M. Gervase, Remedy or Not?: Public Housing
Segregation and Suburban Exclusion (Feb. 9, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
' See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 910-12 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (finding no criterion other than race that could plausibly explain the location
of public family housing sites in overwhelmingly segregated communities). Suburbs
have accepted multifamily subsidized housing when it has been designated for elderly
1995] 1357
1358 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1351
establishes that the federal government has been fully complicit with
the local agencies in that discrimination." Segregation in public
housing and other federal programs continues.24 A recent HUD
report confirms that "most African Americans living in public
housing live in a largely African-American and poor community,
whereas whites, living in elderly housing, typically live in areas with
large numbers of whites who are not poor."25 The federal govern-
ment never has performed its constitutionally mandated duty to
white occupancy and protected by rules that give preferences to residents of suburbs.
See Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994). Cities have sited family public
housing in predominantly minority neighborhoods, rejecting sites in white areas of
the cities.
23 For contemporary indictments of federal segregative activities in public housing,
see supra note 20; see also Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1423-25 (8th Cir.
1983) (holding that, despite findings of noncompliance, agency permitted Texarkana
public housing program to discriminate illegally); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503
F.2d 1236, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that HUD violated Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fifth Amendment
by approving a housing project that discriminated against African-Americans); Graves
v. Romney, 502 F.2d 1062, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1974) (leaving undisturbed the district
court's unchallenged holding that HUD violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 by not considering the impact of
a public housing project on the racial concentration and potential urban blight on the
neighborhood), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 739-40
(holding HUD liable for playing a significant role in constructing and maintaining
Chicago's segregated public housingsystem); Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1056-57 (holding
that agency knowingly created, promoted, and funded racially segregated housing in
36 counties of east Texas in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding that agency
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by controlling and directing the
Bogalusa Housing Authority's segregated housing program).
214 See Craig Flournoy & George Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal: Illegal Segregation
Pervades Nation's Subsidized Housing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 1985, reprinted
in Discrimination in Federally Assisted Housing Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Hous. and Community Dev., 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 22-57 (1986).
The fact that segregation has not been disestablished is evident in federal
litigation in which the duty to desegregate has been imposed explicitly for particular
geographic areas and yet has not been satisfied. See, e.g., Clients' Council, 711 F.2d at
1426 (holding that evidence in HUD's own files clearly indicates that HUD officials
acted in discriminatory manner); Sanders v. HUD, 872 F. Supp. 216, 223 (W.D. Pa.
1994) (approving consent decree); Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.
Tex. 1989) (ruling that consent decree was violated); Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1060
(addressing discrimination in 36 counties in east Texas); HUD's Responses to
Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions at 24, Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D.
Tex. 1989) (No. 3:85-CV-1210-R) [hereinafter HUD's Responses].25 JOHN GOERING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., THE LOCATION AND
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE RACIAL OCCUPANCYAND LOCATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS 1 (1994).
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undo that segregation, to eliminate its vestiges "root and
branch."2"
Racial discrimination in other federal housing programs has
helped to confine blacks to public housing. The Section 8 Existing
Housing Assistance Program is administered in a racially discrimina-
tory way, with HUD's complicity:27 blacks in public housing or on
the public housing waiting list are told that they cannot apply for
Section 8 without losing their place on the public housing list; they
are refused access to Section 8 subsidies in the suburbs through the
employment of residency preferences and other discriminatory
mechanisms.2" Why are Section 202 projects predominantly white?
Why do black elderly and handicapped people more often live in
public housing than in Section 202 housing? Very poor whites have
options that very poor blacks lack. While whites are only 35% of the
public housing population, they hold 45% of the certificates/
vouchers and reside in 57% of the subsidized, project-based
housing. 29  The HUD-assisted programs' affirmative marketing
regulations are ignored."0  The federal government's largest
contemporary subsidized housing production program-the Low
26 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). The obligation is imposed
in the school cases, notably Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38, and is extended to housing by
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284,305-06 (1976). See also Roberta Achtenberg, Keynote
Address, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (1995) (stating that "successive administrations
... have repeatedly missed opportunities to combat discrimination").
27 Minority recipients of and applicants to public housing assistance in Buffalo
have filed a class action against HUD and the Buffalo housing authorities alleging
racially discriminatory administration of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. See
Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Glover v. Crestwood
Lake Section 1 Holding Co., 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); GEORGE E. PETERSON
& KALE WILLIAMS, URBAN INST., HOUSING MOBILITY: WHAT HAS IT ACCOMPLISHED
AND WHAT IS ITS PROMISE? 18-20 (1994) (acknowledging the existence of a Section
8 submarket); Philip D. Tegeler et al., Transforming Section 8 into a Regional
Housing Mobility Program 5 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2aSee Comer, 37 F.3d at 789-92.
See 1992 HUD Civil Rights Report 3. Newman and Schnare further conclude
that:
The most dramatic difference between public housing residents and
certificate and voucher holders relates to race. According to our estimates,
72 percent of all households with children in public housing are African
American, compared with 44 percent in the certificate and voucher
programs and 45 percent in privately owned assisted stock.
Newman & Schnare, supra note 14, at 424-25.
o See Laura Lazarus, Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations: HUD's
Failed Attempt to Implement a Good Idea 14-23 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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Income Housing Tax Credit-operates without any civil rights
regulations and without information about the race of residents and
the extent of segregation in or near project sites."1 Both HUD and
the President have acknowledged the federal government's failure
affirmatively to advocate measures to promote fair housing.
3 2
I consider that the single most important reason why poor
people are concentrated in conventional public housing is that racial
discrimination continues to move poor people out of federally aided
housing other than pubic housing. I proceed, however, to consider
the other suggestions made by Professors Schill and Wachter.
B. Bad Physical Conditions in Public Housing
as a Cause of Concentrated Poverty
I completely agree with Schill and Wachter that bad physical
conditions in public housing promote concentrated poverty. When
public housing is substandard, people who have options other than
public housing will live elsewhere. 33 The factors that create bad
physical conditions, therefore, encourage poverty concentration.
Those factors include: the systemic omission of a capital-replace-
ment reserve from the public housing program; consistently
inadequate funding for major repair and rehabilitation, whether
termed modernization or comprehensive improvement;34 inade-
quate definition and funding of operating subsidies; and deplorable
management and shirking of responsibility by several public housing
authorities (PHAs), with HUD refusal to use its statutory authority
to correct the conditions. 35  The poor physical conditions in
51 SeeJarrett T. Barrios, Federal and State Fair Housing Obligations Administering
the Low-Income HousingTax Credit 16 (Aug. 31, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
12 See Achtenberg, supra note 26, at 1194-95; see also Exec. Order No. 12892, 59
Fed. Reg. 2939 (1994) (establishing the President's Fair Housing Council, a group
headed by the Secretary of HUD, which is to coordinate and oversee the implementa-
tion of federal fair housing programs); HUD's Responses, supra note 24, at 76
(admitting that HUD "did not fulfill HUD's obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968").
3' See Newman & Schnare, supra note 14, at 426-27 ("[P]rivately owned assisted
stock is in better shape than public housing or the stock of privately owned housing
occupied by certificate and voucher holders.").
4 See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, MORE HOUSING, MORE FAIRLY: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, BACKGROUND
PAPER ON THE LIMrrs OF PRIVATIZATION 54-55 (1991); see also Rachel G. Bratt, Public
Housing: The Controversy and Contribution, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING
335, 340 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
" HUD has the statutory authority to take over housing authorities that default
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predominantly minority public housing projects are both the results
of racial discrimination and an effective barrier to desegregation.
C. Federal Income Eligibility, Preference Requirements,
and Rent Regulations as Causes of Concentrated
Poverty in Public Housing
1. Income Eligibility
Contrary to Schill and Wachter's suggestion, federal income
eligibility limits do not explain the extreme poverty concentrations
that exist in public housing. The income limits are set at 80% and
50% of HUD's adjusted area median family income (HAMFI): "low
income" is defined as 80% of HAMFI and "very low income" is
defined as 50% of HAMFI 6 The national average HAMFI in 1989
was $34,800. The very-low-income level, 50% of HAMFI, was
$17,400. The median household income of public housing residents
was approximately $6571, one-third of the very-low-income
eligibility level.37 Public housing incomes fall far below not only
the income eligibility limit but also the incomes in other programs
with similar eligibility standards.38 Thus, something other than
income eligibility explains why the very poorest people live in public
housing, rather than in other housing that has the same or similar
income eligibility requirements.
on their obligations, including the obligation to maintain decent conditions. HUD,
however, has been very reluctant to use this authority, leaving the courts to impose
receiverships. See, e.g., Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257, 1278-79 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that public housing tenants had a private right of action against HUD as the
operator of a local housing authority that engaged in de facto demolition of public
housing projects); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1254 (Mass. 1980)
(upholding the imposition of receivership on the board of a city housing authority
after the board failed to perform its duties properly). HUD has generally refused to
exercise its statutory authority to take over PHAs that were failing in their obligations
to residents.
56 For the definition of "low income," see supra note 5.
37 See CASEY, supra note 18, at 10-11. It is important to emphasize that many of
these very poor people are elderly. Forty-seven percent of the public housing
residents in 1989 depended upon Social Security or pensions for income; only 45%
depended upon AFDC or SSI. Stegman found that 38% of public housing residents
were elderly and only 42% of the households included a wage earner. See STEGMAN,
supra note 34, at 52.
' See supra note 18.
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2. Preferences
Federal preferences may play a role in bringing more very poor
people into public housing. The preferences are designed for
persons who have been displaced by government action, who live in
substandard housing, or who pay more than 50% of their income
for rent." Eligibility for federal preferences-that is, worst-case
housing need-is much more common among households at
approximately 35% of area median income than among those
households with incomes between 35% and 50%.40 If PHAs follow
the law, most people who are admitted into public housing will be
those who hold federal preferences.
41
Nonetheless, there are several reasons why it is unlikely that the
preference scheme has had substantial responsibility for concentrat-
ing extremely poor people in public housing. First, federal
preferences apply only to some new admissions, not to all public
housing units.42 Second, PHAs are allowed to "rank" preferences,
as well as to define the categories, and are able to use verification
requirements to reduce the likelihood that very poor people will be
able to gain admission.43 Thus, for example, "PHAs may give top
39 See NATIONAL Hous. LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS'
RIGHTS § 2.3.22 (2d ed. 1994). Federal preferences for applicants who live in
substandard housing, who are displaced, or who are overburdened by rent are set
forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i) and 1437f(d)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The HUD regulations implementing the preferences are set forth at 24 C.F.R.
§§ 880.613, 881.613, 882.219, and 960.211 (1994).
40 See Kathryn P. Nelson & Jill Khadduri, To Whom Should Limited Housing
Resources Be Directed?, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1, 3 (1991) (citation omitted).
" It is by no means clear to what extent PHAs do follow the federal preference
rules. The rules themselves have changed substantially, and HUD regulations have
not kept up with the statutory changes. See Barbara Sard, The Massachusetts Experience
with Targeted Tenant-Based Rental Assistance for the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy
for Socially Disfavored Groups (pt. 2), 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 182, 199 n.27
(1994) [hereinafter Sard, Socially Disfavored Groups]. HUD's most recent preference
regulations are at 59 Fed. Reg. 36,616 (public housing and Section 8 noncertificate
and voucher) and 59 Fed. Reg. 36,662 (certificate and voucher) (July 18, 1994).
Moreover, PHAs often have been hostile to the federal preference requirements and
have ignored them. See, e.g., Paris v. HUD, 843 F.2d 561,562 (1988) (stating that the
scheme "approved by HUD, seeks to provide for a broad economic mix of tenants by
allowing certain higher income families to 'skip' over 'very low income' families that
are senior to them on the waiting list"). At least one experienced advocate suspects
that "there may be widespread violation of the federal preference regulations."
Barbara Sard, Housing the Homeless Through Expanding Access to Existing Subsidized
Housing Programs, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1113, 1130 (1991) [hereinafter Sard, Housing the
Homeless].
42 See Sard, Socially Disfavored Groups, supra note 41, at 184.
4s See id. at 187; Sard, Housing the Homeless, supra note 41, at 1141; see also Gary
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preference to those deemed homeless through no fault of their
own-for example, as a result of natural disaster, domestic violence
despite judicial restraining orders, or court-ordered eviction where
the rent exceeded some substantial percentage of household
income."4 4 While applicants with legal representation may be
successful in overcoming some such barriers, few applicants will
have such aid.45 Perhaps most importantly, communities have been
permitted to give highest preference to the federal preference
holders who also have local preferences. Thus, persons who satisfy
local residency preferences are admitted before people from other
areas.
46
Third, and perhaps conclusively, the Section 8 projects and the
Section 8 certificate and voucher programs, which have substantially
the same preference requirements as the conventional public
housing program, have average and median income levels that are
much higher than those in public housing. 7 Plainly, the agencies
and sponsors administering those programs are finding higher-
income residents who satisfy the federal preference system. The
preference requirements, therefore, do not fully explain why most
very poor people are admitted into public housing.
3. Rent Regulation
Rent standards may contribute to concentrating poverty in
public housing. From 1969 to 1981, public housing rents were
limited, in general, to 25% of household income. In 1981, Congress
directed an increase to 30% of household income." This change,
to some degree, made it more attractive for those with other
options to leave, thus concentrating poverty in public housing. To
some extent, this has been offset by the authorization to public
housing agencies to apply rent ceilings and allow higher-income
L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing Bureaucratic Disentitlement, 16 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 591, 592-93 (1987-1988).
" Sard, Socially Disfavored Groups, supra note 41, at 187.
45 See id. at 187.
" See Sard, Housing the Homeless, supra note 41, at 1129; see also Comer v. Cisneros,
37 F.3d 775, 792 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that under the U.S. Housing Act, HUD may
assist a family which lives in ajurisdiction before a family which does not, subject to
constitutional limits).
Until theJuly 18,1994 regulations, private landlords were required to take more
federal preference holders than must PHAs, but the private landlords' tenants had
higher incomes than do the PHA's. See supra note 18.
"' See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,95 Stat. 357.
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people to stay.49 HUD economists, however, hypothesize that
increasing rent charges from 25% to 30% of income "probably had
greater effect" on inducing higher-income residents to leave public
housing than did the 1981 limitation of admission to those with 50%
of area median income. °
D. Procedural Rights as Causes of Concentrated Poverty
Since the 1960s, federal, state, and local courts, legislatures, and
agencies have accorded public housing applicants and residents a
variety of procedural and substantive "rights."5  Schill and
Wachter assert that "the resulting loss of PHA freedom to select and
evict tenants has contributed to the concentration of poverty within
public housing."5" They offer no empirical support for this
assertion; what theoretical justification they offer is deficient for the
reasons that follow.5 3
See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1292-96.
o See Nelson & Khadduri, supra note 40, at 2.
51I put the word "rights" in quotation marks to question whether the "rights" are
real or illusory. In this area, as with respect to preferences, there is reason to doubt
the extent to which tenants' "rights" are recognized in practice. See, e.g., Samuels v.
District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199-202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (challenging the D.C.
PHA's failure to implement grievance procedure regulations). In general, unless
public housing applicants and residents have counsel, which seldom is the case, they
are unlikely to know what "rights" they theoretically possess and are unlikely to be
able to enforce those "rights."
Public housing applicants and residents have many rights "on paper," including
of course the "right" not to be subject to discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or national origin. We know that discrimination on the basis of race, color, and
national origin occurs now at housing authorities; only recently, the New York City
Housing Authority settled a case in which the U.S. Department ofJustice accused it
of discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin, assigning white
applicants to "white only" projects. See Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 839 F.
Supp. 215,217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). When we know that this kind of racial discrimina-
tion was occurring in New York in 1990, can we doubt that applicants and residents
are deprived of many other "rights" in public housing programs through the country?
52 Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1299. This is an instance of the fallacious
identification of poverty with behavior. "Problem" tenants are not necessarily very
poor tenants. Poor elderly people, for example, are not considered "problem"
residents. There is no rational or empirical support for the proposition that very
poor families will be "problem" residents.
" The author of this Paper is proud to have been one of the legion of legal
services, civil rights, and civil liberties advocates who worked to secure and maintain
these procedural rights. This certainly affords her particular knowledge of the
subject. Readers will have to determine for themselves whether the association affects
the author's judgment on this issue.
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Applicants' procedural rights are essentially the same for all
HUD housing programs; the procedural rights cannot be the reason
why more very poor people are in public housing.54 Applicants for
all the HUD-assisted housing programs are entitled to have their
applications measured against known "ascertainable standards" and
to have their applications considered "in some reasonable man-
ner.""5 Applicants who are rejected are entitled to be given notice
stating the reasons for the rejection.56 All applicants are entitled
to some form of review of the rejection.5" When an application for
federal preference, which often will determine admissibility, is
denied, the applicant is entitled only to notice and an opportunity
to meet with some person, who may even be a subordinate of the
person who made the original denial." These procedures are not
very substantial.
Schill and Wachter assert that "the ability of PHAs to screen out
potentially troublesome tenants has been reduced as has their power
to evict those harmful to the community."59 In fact, however,
PHAs retain ample authority to screen and to evict persons
"harmful to the community." The procedural protections for
tenants threatened with eviction are eliminated for tenants accused
of conduct harmful to others. So long as a due process court
proceeding is available, no grievance procedure is required for
evictions premised on alleged drug-related criminal activity on or
near the premises or other criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by
other tenants or PHA employees.6 °
' These rights are grounded in constitutional due process requirements. See
Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254(1970); Caulderv. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
5s Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1968); see
also Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982) (Section 8); Colon v. Tomkins
Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (subsidized housing).
56 See HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 39, § 2.15.5.
57 See id. § 2.15.6. The review takes different forms for different programs.
s See id. § 2.15.6.4; 24 C.F.R. 882.219(k) (1994).
'9 Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1299.
0 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 24 C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i)
(1994) (providing that a PHA may exclude from its administrative procedure any
grievance involving eviction based on either "criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other residents or
employees of the PHA" or "drug-related criminal activity"); see also HUD HOUSING
PROGRAMS, supra note 39, § 13.2.4.2, at 13/5 to 13/7 (discussing these exceptions to
ordinary PHA grievance procedure).
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There are substantive constraints on admissions and evictions.
PHAs are not permitted to condition admission or continued
occupancy upon per se status standards. Thus, PHAs are not
permitted to exclude an applicant for being an unwed mother or a
single parent.61 These standards apply by handbook or by contract
to most of the other housing programs. 62  "[S]o long as status
discrimination and Fair Housing Act violations are avoided and
applicable federal preferences are applied,"6" however, PHAs and
other landlords have broad discretion to condition admission and
continued occupancy upon satisfaction of "desirability" stan-
dards.6 4 PHAs may deny admission or evict tenants for "poor
housekeeping,"65 nonpayment of rent,66 prior criminal activity or
record,67 or other evidence of "undesirability."68
61 See HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 39, § 2.6. These per se standards are
illegal because they are irrational. An intensive evaluation of Boston public housing
between 1969 and 1975 concluded that "'for every single-parent family identified as
a problem tenant, 16 were causing no trouble. Race, size of family, length of
occupancy, source of income, and age of children all proved to be equally irrelevant.'"
Id. § 2.9 (citation omitted). A fuller discussion of the irrationality of associating status
or poverty with behavior is warranted but not possible within the constraints of this
Paper.
HUD's new regulations authorize employment as a selection preference. See 24
C.F.R. 260.205(a) (1994). The fiscal year 1995 Appropriations Act allows a preference
for working families for public housing and project-based Section 8 housing. See Pub.
L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2298 (1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437d(c)(4)(A)(ii), 1437f(d)(1)(A)(ii)).
62 See HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 39, § 2.6.1, at 2/28 n.315 (listing
HUD handbook provisions and program contracts which ban the automatic exclusion
of applicants based on class membership).
63 Id. § 2.8.4, at 2/38.
6 Id. § 2.9, at 2/39 (explaining that "[d]esirability standards can be justified...
if reasonably related to sheltering the poor").
65 Id. § 2.9.1, at 2/40 to 2/41.
66 See id. § 2.9.2, at 2/41; see also id. § 14.2.4.7, at 14/18 to 14/19 (regarding
absence of tenant fault).67 See id. § 2.9.3, at 2/42 to 2/43.
' See id. § 14.2.7.4 (noting vague standards for undesirability). Other tenant
actions which may constitute grounds for eviction include damage to unit and
creating a disturbance. See id. §§ 14.2.7.5-.11.
An experienced tenant advocate who studied the issue recently reported that
"regardless of the unproven merits of tenant suitability screening, it is lawful and
encouraged in public housing and tends to exclude members of socially disfavored
groups." Sard, Socially Disfavored Groups, supra note 41, at 204 n.68. Sard described
a recent Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) client who was denied eligibility by the
Boston Housing Authority (BHA) "because her criminal record information showed
an unresolved arrest for prostitution 22 years ago." Id. at 204 n.65. Sard reports that
her office worked to get this denial reversed at a BHA administrative appeal and
explained that it was "one of the few reversals of a tenant suitability denial" the GBLS
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Eviction from subsidized housing involves loss of two important
interests: a home and a financial contribution to the cost of
housing. The importance of the interests is the basis for requiring
notice and an opportunity for a minimal due process hearing before
these interests can be lost. Lesser protections have been accorded
applicants. The protections are strongest where government
involvement is greatest.
These protections cannot explain why more poor people are in
public housing than in other kinds of subsidized housing. First, the
fundamental notions of notice, fair consideration, and rational
standards apply to all the programs. Second, the more elaborate
provisions that govern PHA decisions, especially eviction, are
inapplicable to allegations of criminal conduct, which in any event
is not synonymous with poverty. Third, the substantive constraint-
the requirement of good cause for action-allows PHAs broad
discretion in admission and evictions. If there were no procedural
and substantive protections, if PHAs could reject and evict with
complete arbitrariness, public housing still would have the greatest
concentrations of very poor people, because people of color, who
disproportionately are poor, are excluded from other subsidized
housing programs.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC HOUSING
AND NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY RATES
Schill and Wachter seek to suggest that large public housing
developments for families cause neighborhood blight. They show
that in Philadelphia such projects are located in neighborhoods with
undesirable conditions. In response, I make two observations.
First, as Schill and Wachter emphasize, the public housing about
which they write is large, multi-unit developments, and it is housing
for families with children, not for elderly persons. Thus, their
discussion does not pertain to low-rise, garden apartments or single-
family housing, which together comprise 73% of total public
housing. 69  Nothing in the Schill and Wachter article would
homelessness unit actually obtained. Id.; see also id. at 188 (stating that "PHAs...
[may legally] reject potential tenants based on any type of criminal record, problems
with misbehaving children, poor landlord references, history of difficulties in paying
rent, or even allegations of messy housekeeping").
" See STEGMAN, supra note 34, at 51 ("UJlust 27 percent of all public housing
developments are high-rise buildings; 32 percent are garden apartments; 16 percent
are low-rise, walk-up apartments; and 25 percent are single-family or townhouse struc-
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support those who oppose placing single-family scattered-site public
housing units in better-served communities.
70
Second, Schill and Wachter demonstrate that in Philadelphia the
location of large public housing developments for families strongly
correlates with undesirable neighborhood conditions, but they do
not prove that those public housing developments cause the
undesirable neighborhood conditions. HUD and local governments
put large public housing family developments into minority
neighborhoods that lacked the political power to prevent being the
object of municipal "dumping." For the same reasons, minority
neighborhoods also suffer from diminished and degraded public
services. The presence of large public housing developments and
poor neighborhood conditions stem from the same cause; one does
not cause the other.7 1
The Schill and Wachter regression analysis shows that many
more poor families reside in Philadelphia census tracts with large
numbers of public housing units than in Philadelphia census tracts
without much public housing.72 This is entirely consistent with the
hypothesis that public housing placement and high poverty are
effects of another cause. Massey and Denton suggest racial
segregation as a principal cause, 73 while economists George Galster
and Ronald Mincy suggest that job growth and location are
others. 74 HUD's recent report strongly suggests racial discrimina-
tures.").
71 See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1193-94 (2d Cir.
1987) (describing the ability of "white" neighborhoods to exclude public housing),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); see also Forcing "Balance" Upsets Freedom, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, May 17, 1994, at 6 (opposing forced desegregation of low-income
housing);Josh Kovner, Third Arson HitsMorris Cove, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 27, 1992,
at I (detailing third arson of home targeted for low-income housing program); Mitch
Raab, Kindness Breaks Through Discord, NEw HAVEN REG., Aug. 23, 1993, at 1 (noting
neighborhood resistance to scattered-site housing).
"' See Walker v. HUD, No. 3:85-CV-1210-R (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 1995) (remedial
order affecting DHA), at 1, 7 (acknowledging that a vestige of past discrimination
pervades the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) public housing projects in that 92% of
black, nonelderly households are in segregated areas where the poverty rate exceeds
40%, and these units, projects, and neighborhoods are "substantially inferior to the
conditions in which low income whites receive HUD assistance").
' See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1306.
73 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 84-88 (discussing the relationship
between racial segregation and socioeconomic segregation).
74 See George C. Galster & Ronald B. Mincy, Understanding the Changing Fortunes
of Metropolitan Neighborhoods: 1980 to 1990, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 303, 343-45
(1993) (discussing how job growth and the location of manufacturing employment
affect neighborhood poverty along racial lines).
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tion as the cause: "[T]he majority of African Americans living in
public housing projects in the United States are living in poverty-
concentrated areas, while the majority of public housing white
tenants-both families and the elderly-are living in neighborhoods
with substantially lower poverty rates."
75
Large public housing developments for families need not cause
neighborhood blight. The architecture is not at fault: many upper-
income people, predominantly white, including families with
children, live comfortably in large, high-rise buildings in upper-scale
neighborhoods of New York and other cities. Concentration of
poverty is not the crucial element: very poor people can live
decently in large, high-rise buildings without blighting their
neighborhoods-so long as the very poor people are white and
elderly. Public housing for families does not necessarily blight
surrounding neighborhoods: as Schill and Wachter report, studies
show that the presence of public housing does not diminish
surrounding property values. 6 In Montgomery County, Maryland,
when public housing units were incorporated into high-income
subdivision developments, property values in those developments
increased more than in comparable developments without the
public housing units.77 What is crucial in Montgomery County is
that the housing is racially and economically integrated. In general,
neighborhood blight becomes an issue only when the public housing
development is very large and the residents are all nonwhite, very
poor families with children.
III. CURRENT POLICIES: THE ONE-FOR-ONE
REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENT
Schill and Wachter attack the statutory requirement of one-for-
one replacement for any public housing units demolished. 71 "The
effects of the one-for-one replacement requirement," they write,
"have been pernicious for many inner-city communities. PHAs,
lacking the money to build new units or renovate existing develop-
ments, have often been forced to retain deteriorated or vacant
projects rather than demolish them."7 I want to offer a gloss on
that: it is not the one-for-one replacement requirement that is at
75 GOERING, supra note 25, at 31.
71 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1300 & n.70.
'n See PETERSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 78.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 14 3 7p (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
71 Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1314-15.
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fault; it is noncompliance with the one-for-one requirement. Schill
and Wachter's real argument is not against the one-for-one
requirement, but against implementation of the requirement in a
way that discourages replacement or rehabilitation of severely
distressed public housing.
Five issues have plagued the one-for-one replacement debate.
The first is whether subsidized units should be replaced at all.
Those who deplore federal provision of housing subsidies obviously
would welcome a diminution of the subsidized housing stock.
Certainly, this is not Schill and Wachter's position. If one takes the
view that the government should subsidize housing for people who
cannot otherwise secure decent housing, the one-for-one require-
ment is beneficent, not pernicious: it assures that the precious
stock of housing subsidies will not be diminished. Given that the
government currently provides housing subsidies to only one in
three poverty-level families,8" housing subsidies need to be in-
creased, not reduced.
The second issue is whether replacement should be by "hard"
public housing units or by certificates or vouchers. "Hard" units
have the virtue of long-term availability; certificates and vouchers
are short-lived. "Hard" units also are more likely to include three-,
four-, and five-bedroom units needed by large, low-income families.
"Hard" units add to the stock of community-owned housing, while
certificates and vouchers merely help pay rent."' Certificates and
vouchers, on the other hand, have the virtues of allowing choice and
dispersal; they can enable racial and economic integration in
jurisdictions in which PHAs might not be able to build units. This
last virtue makes certificates and vouchers especially attractive to
some and especially odious to others.
8 2
The third one-for-one replacement issue has been site selection.
Just as certificates and vouchers have aroused enthusiasm and
80 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING 1994, at 16 (1994).
8" The relative costs of the two programs are a matter of intense debate. HUD's
most recent report is that the monthly subsidy per occupied unit of public housing
is $481, and the cost of a certificate for the same family would be $440. The
comparison does not take into account the capital asset that the public housing unit
would represent. See Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Will It Cost More to Replace Public Housing with Certificates? (Mar. 1995)
(issue brief, on file with author); Response of the National Housing Law Project (Apr.
14, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8 See, e.g., Karen de Witt, Housing Voucher Test in Maiyland Is Scuttled by a Political
Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at B10.
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opposition for their capacity to undo or exacerbate segregation,
replacement by "hard" public housing units poses the issue even
more strongly. HUD's current Site and Neighborhood Standard
regulation on its face favors siting in nonsegregated, nonimpacted
areas, 3 although in reality the exceptions to the regulation have
swallowed the general rule, and replacement units have been
approved for segregated, poverty-concentrated locations. 4
In many situations, funding is available, but the actual provision
of the replacement units is delayed because of political opposition
to the siting of public housing units. In New Haven, Connecticut,
for example, funding was available for replacement of the Elm
Haven high-rise with scattered-site public housing, to be constructed
or acquired in nonsegregated neighborhoods; although suitable sites
were identified promptly, many years elapsed without significant
progress toward replacing the units.8 5 As this example suggests, a
principal obstacle to replacing units is opposition to having black
public housing residents living in nonsegregated, nonghetto
neighborhoods. The opposition is to the people, regardless of the
kind of housing in which they live. The opposition is not to the
people's poverty: poor white people live in those neighborhoods
without hindrance. The opposition is to the race and color of the
would-be residents.
The fourth issue has been funding. Congress never has
appropriated enough money to repair or replace all severely
distressed public housing, and Congress has not allowed PHAs a
free hand in allocating money between modernization and demoli-
tion/replacement.
The final issue has been competence. While some PHAs have
done a very good job of modernization and demolition with
replacement, others have allowed funding to stand unused.
Each of these issues demands its own solution, and the problem
and solutions will differ for each public housing development in
each community. More flexibility to use funding for replacement
rather than modernization and for certificates and vouchers rather
than hard units would be welcome.8 6 The one response that ought
24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c) (1994).
84See NATIONAL HOUS. LAW PROJECT, PUBLIC HOUSING IN PERIL, 1990, at 79; see
also Class Action Complaint, Christian Community Action, Inc. v. Kemp (D. Conn.
1991) (No. 391CV00296 TFGD).
8 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 84, at 15-19.
8 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: FUNDING AND OTHER
CONSTRAINTS LIMIT HOUSING AUTHoRITIEs' ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH ONE-FOR-ONE
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to be unacceptable is elimination of the one-for-one replacement
requirement. What that would achieve is simply elimination of
subsidized units. Schill and Wachter's central point is that the worst
result is keeping "deteriorated or vacant projects." I disagree. I
think the worst result would be to eliminate the "deteriorated or
vacant projects" without requiring that the subsidies be replaced,
one for one, with whatever combination of "hard" units or certifi-
cates or vouchers would best produce decent housing with genuine
free choice of location. The real solution to the problem of high-
rises that should be demolished is an effective program of replacing
these units with scattered-site units and certificates or vouchers in
nonsegregated, nonpoor neighborhoods.
In the current political context, discussing the one-for-one
replacement requirement is quite removed from reality: this
Congress is likely to eliminate the requirement altogether. If the
requirement should be eliminated, proposed demolitions will be
challenged as violations of the constitutional and statutory civil
rights obligations: the decision to demolish without replacement
projects that housed minorities raises obvious civil rights issues. A
lawful, humane, and responsible subsidized housing policy would
honor the fundamental principle that the one-for-one requirement
embodies: the need to increase, and certainly not to decrease, the




Schill and Wachter offer four solutions to the problem of
concentrated poverty in public housing. Their proposals are:
increasing fair housing enforcement, removing land use barriers
that inhibit the production of affordable housing, changing several
aspects of the current public housing program, and expanding
housing mobility programs. I agree with them only about the last.
RULE 11 (1995) ("To assist housing authorities to make the best use of the resources
at their disposal, the Congress should consider giving the Secretary of HUD the
flexibility to approve alternative approaches to replacing nonviable housing that has
been demolished or sold.").
" The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Affordable Housing urged that "no
privatization effort should be undertaken without a clear commitment that every unit
lost to the public housing stock will be replaced on a unit-for-unit basis." STEGMAN,
supra note 34, at 16.
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A. Fair Housing Enforcement
Fair housing enforcement alone is not a tool for deconcentrating
poverty. Most fair housing enforcement is driven by individual
complaints, and a disproportionate amount of the enforcement
activity is on behalf of persons with disabilities and families with
children rather than on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities.
8 8
Even when the complaints are of racial or ethnic discrimination,
they are unlikely to come from very poor people. Relatively few
poor people of color have the time, confidence, and psychic energy
to pursue fair housing complaints.
Fair lending is of questionable utility for deconcentrating
poverty. Schill and Wachter perform a very useful function in
separating three distinct but related issues: to whom is the money
being loaned, for what purpose is it being loaned, and in which
neighborhoods will it be used? It is not enough to say that more
money should be loaned to people of color or for minority
neighborhoods: lending money to build more housing in those
neighborhoods will not likely contribute to desegregation; lending
more money to enable people to leave those neighborhoods will not
promote deconcentration of poverty. Fair lending for single-family
homeownership is a program directed at moderate- or middle-
income blacks, not at very poor people: very poor people cannot
afford homeownership in cities. If "fair lending" increases black
homeownership in minority neighborhoods, it exacerbates racial
concentration. If it enables blacks to move to white neighborhoods,
it exacerbates poverty concentration by leaving poor blacks behind.
In the relatively unusual event that fair lending programs enable
higher-income whites to move to poor black neighborhoods,
desegregation and deconcentration would occur at the expense of
poor black people. Loans directed towards minority neighborhoods
may be desirable, and they may promote physical improvement of
the neighborhoods, but they are not tools for deconcentration and
desegregation.
" See James A. Kushner, Federal Enforcement andJudicial Review of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 537, 565-66 & nn.162-63 (1992)
(warning that fewer administrative enforcement resources will be available to combat
traditional racial and ethnic discrimination because of a substantial increase in
familial and disability bias claims).
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B. Land Use Regulation
Encouraging affordable housing development alone will not do
much to deconcentrate poverty. Shallow-subsidy, affordable
housing reduces the cost of housing only by a relatively small
amount; it cannot, standing alone, deconcentrate poor areas.
Indeed, developing shallow-subsidy, affordable housing programs
that include genuine fair housing principles might well enable
moderate-income people to leave poor areas, thereby further
isolating and concentrating people who are poor. This is not to say
that affordable housing should not be constructed; rather, it is to
insist that, to achieve deconcentration, affordable housing construc-
tion must be linked to both deeper subsidies and desegregative
action. The provision of a deep subsidy is crucial to enable very
poor people of color to move to nonpoor areas. Schill and Wachter
suggest that providing shallow-subsidy units in higher-income white
areas can achieve deconcentration and desegregation because poor
blacks will use demand-side subsidies-Section 8 certificates and
vouchers-to move to these units.8 9 Experience shows, however,
that that linkage is unlikely to be made unless it is required by law.
The shallow-subsidy developments that now exist in white areas have
not achieved racial desegregation, despite civil rights laws, including
HUD's Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations.
90
C. Changes in the Housing Programs
Schill and Wachter fault the public housing program for
concentrating poverty; I fault the other housing programs for
excluding most poor people. Schill and Wachter propose changes
to public housing; I maintain that solving the problems of public
housing will require changes in other housing programs. Alterna-
tive housing must be made available to the very poor for whom
public housing is now the only significant option. If public housing
remains the only viable option for the thirteen million poor
households in the United States, it will continue to be a source of
concentrated poverty. If we are not willing to end poverty but want
to deconcentrate it, we must make it possible for poor people to live
in places other than public housing.
" See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1335-36; see also Michael H. Schill, Race,
the Underclass, and Public Policy, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY, 433, 453 (1994).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 (discussing HUD's complicity in
perpetuating segregation).
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One place to begin is with the deeply subsidized housing in
predominantly white, nonpoverty areas. Public housing for the
elderly often is located in predominantly white neighborhoods (and
is occupied predominantly by white residents);9 1 Section 8 New
Construction or Substantial Rehabilitation, Section 236 deep
subsidy, Section 202 or 202/8 projects exist in white neighborhoods
and serve white residents. Further, shallow-subsidy developments,
publicly financed but privately owned, are located in predominantly
white, nonpoverty-concentrated areas in cities and suburbs. 92 An
effective program of deconcentrating poverty and desegregating
federally assisted housing would bring this stock of federally
subsidized housing into compliance with civil rights laws, including
the Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations.93  Shallow-
subsidy developments should be required to accept a percentage of
Section 8 certificate and voucher holders or, at the least, be
prohibited from discriminating against them. 4
The FHA home mortgage assistance program also should be
used to promote desegregation and deconcentration. As Schill and
Wachter point out, this program was a principal cause of segrega-
tion and poverty concentration;95 now it should be used to undo
the damage it caused.
6
As other forms of federal assistance produce new housing
developments, these new developments should be required to
include some very poor families. Such programs could be modeled
on the program pioneered in Montgomery County, Maryland, in
which an inclusionary zoning ordinance, in effect since 1974,
requires subdivisions of fifty or more units to make available to the
9' See GOERING, supra note 25, at 1 (stating that "whites, living in elderly housing,
typically live in areas with large numbers of whites who are not poor").
' Seventy-six percent of all black households and 67% of all Hispanic households
receiving federally subsidized housing assistance are in central cities, while 59% of all
non-Hispanic white households receiving such assistance live outside central cities.
See CASEY, supra note 18, at 2-3 (tabulating the characteristics of renter-occupied
units).
s See Lazarus, supra note 30.
At present, federal housing policy prohibits discrimination against Section 8
applicants only by landlords who already rent to other Section 8 tenants and by
sponsors of LIHTC developments. For a discussion of this policy, see supra note 17.
" See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1309-11; see also JACKSON, supra note 8,
at 206-18; Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 9, at 511-21.
' A revised FHA home mortgage assistance program would include incentives for
home purchases that promote desegregation, including a lease-purchase option and
a zero down payment program, such as those recommended by the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Affordable Housing. See STEGMAN, supra note 34, at 20.
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local public housing agency a specified portion of units to lease to
public housing residents. Because of the county's demographics,
most of the people who move into these units are poor and
black.
9 7
HUD has an important role to play in promoting such inclu-
sionary zoning. When HUD has the discretion to disperse funds, it
can and should give preference to communities that promote
diversity. HUD should publicize programs like Montgomery
County's and encourage other communities to emulate them.
98
The public housing program itself must be desegregated.
Desegregation requires the provision of alternative subsidized
housing opportunities, through tenant-based, demand-side subsi-
dies, and by acquisition or construction of new public housing units.
This desegregation is essential as a matter of constitutional and
human rights. Furthermore, the conditions in public housing units,
projects, and neighborhoods must be improved substantially;
improvement requires the infusion of funds for operating subsidies
and modernization, the creation of a replacement reserve in the
program, and the absolute insistence upon competent and effective
management, enforced by a HUD that will use its power to take over
any housing authority that fails to provide decent housing for its
residents.
D. Expansion of Mobility Programs
Schill and Wachter encourage the development of housing
mobility programs like that developed in Gautreaux. 9 I fully agree
" See Florence W. Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Opportuni-
ties, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335, 347 n.94 (1993) (citing the Montgomery County
inclusionary zoning ordinance, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A-1-12 (1989)).
" Fairfax County, Virginia has adopted a similar provision. "Any developer
building over 50 housing units must set aside up to 15 percent as affordable housing.
In return, the developer can build about 20 percent more housing per acre." Eric
Lipton, A Matter of Home Economics: Fairfax's Affordable Housing Turns Dreams into
Reality, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al, A21.
" There is a vast literature about the Gautreaux mobility program. For works by
James Rosenbaum, the principal researcher at Northwestern University, describing the
results of the studies, see generallyJAMES E. ROSENBAUM ET AL., LOW-INCOME BLACK
CHILDREN IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS (1986);JAMES E. ROSENBAUM ET AL., SOCIAL
INTEGRATION OF LOW-INCOME BLA4CK ADULTS IN WHITE MIDDLE-CLASS SUBURBS
(Center for Urban Affairs & Pol'y Research Working Paper No. 91-6, 1991);JAMES E.
ROSENBAUM & PATRICIA MEADEN, HARASSMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF LOW-INCOME
BLACK YOUTH IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS (Center for Urban Affairs & Pol'y
Research Working Paper No. 92-6, 1992);JAMES E. ROSENBAUM & SUSANJ. POPKIN,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HOUSING INTEGRATION (1990); JAMES E.
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with them except for their suggestion that procedural rights should
be reduced.' ° As Peterson and Williams reported:
Mobility should be thought of as a long-term investment with a
potential for long-term payoff. It generates immediate benefits in
household satisfaction and safety. It is relatively inexpensive and
generates some short-run economic benefits to offset the short-run
costs of administration. The potential rewards are to be found in
the lives of children and in the longer-run adjustments that
families make.'
0'
Mobility programs should be not only replicated but improved. As
James Rosenbaum and his colleagues have reported, the Gautreaux
ROSENBAUM & SUSAN J. POPKIN, THE GAUTREAUX PROGRAM: AN EXPERIMENT IN
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1990); Julie E. Kaufman & James E.
Rosenbaum, The Education and Employment of Low-Income Black Youth in White Suburbs,
14 EDUc. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 229 (1992); James E. Rosenbaum, Black
Pioneers-Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and
Children?, 2 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1179 (1991) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Black
Pioneers] James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy
Improve Employmen4 Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 1519 (1993); James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by
Expanding Residential Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 231 (1995);James E. Rosenbaum et al., Low-Income Black Children in White
Suburban Schools: A Study of School and Student Responses, 56 J. NEGRO EDUC. 35
(1987); James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-
Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 342
(ChristopherJencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991);James E. Rosenbaum et al., White
Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and
Problems, 20 URB. REv. 28 (1988).
Alexander Polikoff, lead counsel in the Gautreaux litigation, has also written
about this subject. See generally POLIKOFF, supra note 20; Alexander Polikoff,
Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1988) (reflecting on
the significance of raising questions about judicial involvement in restructuring
institutions through litigation orders). Mary Davis, Associate Director of Chicago's
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities and administrator of the
program, has written on the issue as well. See Mary Davis, The Gautreaux Assisted
Housing Program, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY (G. Thomas
Kingsley & Margery A. Turner eds., 1993). Another close student of the program is
Professor Leonard Rubinowitz of the Northwestern University Center for Urban
Affairs and Policy Research. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Metropolitan Public Housing
Desegregation Remedies: Chicago's Privatization Program, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589
(1992). Professor Rubinowitz is preparing a book about Gautreaux.
For other writing on the Gautreaux mobility program, see KATHLEEN PEROFF,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOuS. & URBAN DEV., THE GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMONSTRATION: AN
EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS (1979); PETERSON &
WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 23-29; Roisman & Botein, supra note 97, at 335.
" Schill and Wachter are careful to urge, however, that "[b]efore eliminating or
modifying these legal protections ... their costs and benefits should be carefully
analyzed." Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1339 n.215.
101 PETERSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 9.
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program succeeds despite the fact that the families do not receive
educational counseling or supplemental assistance with employment,
child care, transportation, or other problems. 10 2 "A program that




We should not have thirteen million very poor families in the
United States, but we do. If we cannot alleviate their poverty, we
must at least provide them with the opportunity to live in decent
housing. Public housing has been virtually the only program
available to these very poor families. We must open the rest of the
housing stock, especially in previously "white" areas, to welcome and
include these families. As we provide additional housing opportuni-
ties, we must also improve the conditions in public housing and the
neighborhoods in which such housing is located. Nothing less than
our humanity and our civilization are at risk if we shirk this duty.
102 See Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers, supra note 99, at 1206-08.
103James E. Rosenbaum, Labor Market Experiences of Low-Income Black Women in
Middle-Class Suburbs: Evidence from a Survey of Gautreaux Program Participants, 12 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 556, 571 (1993); see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2,
at 220 (endorsing these recommendations).
